We analyze the eect of a particular business model of patent assertion, used by some nonpracticing entities (NPEs), on the incentives for innovation. We study producing rms which engage in simultaneous patent races, in a setting with strong but probabilistic patents, where the nal product uses multiple separately patentable components. We characterize the equilibrium of a model that incorporates patent trade, licensing and litigation for a given allocation of patents. We then endogenize the rms' patent portfolios as the outcome of a multi-patent race, in order to explicitly study the incentives for innovation. We show that the impact of an NPE on producing rms is two-fold. First, it increases the marginal value of patenting a discovery and thus enhances the incentives to invest in R&D, because it extracts surplus from rms with smaller portfolios. Second, in some cases it eectively acts as an entry deterrent.
Introduction
The market for intellectual property, and in particular patents, has changed signicantly in recent years.
First, the traditional notion of one-invention-one-patent is obsolete in many industries, particularly in the technology sector. When one product is protected by many complementary patents, the value of a * We appreciate helpful comments and suggestions by Shane Greenstein, Erik Hovenkamp, Michael Mazzeo, William Rogerson, Ron Siegel, Daniel Spulber and Michael Whinston. An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title The Eect of Non-Practicing Entities on the Rate of Innovation † Northwestern University. email: jlemus@u.northwestern.edu patent in isolation might dier from its value inside a patent portfolio (Gans and Stern (2010) ). Second, new actors have appeared in the arena and are shaping the way intellectual property markets work, by exploiting the uncertainty of litigation outcomes. Patent transactions have moved from a system where the majority of sales and licensing deals occurred between inventors and producing rms, to one where intermediaries, who do not directly innovate or participate in the downstream market, have some of the world's largest patent portfolios. These intermediaries are an entirely new kind of actor in the intellectual property sphere and have recently received a considerable amount of public attention. There is currently no consensus on the impact of such intermediaries on the economy.
In this paper we consider what are typically called pure patent assertion entities, nonpracticing entities, patent dealers or, pejoratively, patent trolls. Specically, we study entities which generally do not invest in R&D and do not produce products that rely on their patent portfolios. Instead, they buy existing patents from rms, inventors, and universities, generating revenue by licensing them to producing rms, under the threat of suing alleged infringers. We adopt the denition of Non-Practicing Entity (NPE) as in Hagiu and Yoe (2013) :
... nonpractising entities act as arbitrageurs, rst acquiring patents, ... and then seeking licensing revenues from operating companies through litigation or threat of litigation. These entities do not innovate themselves, nor do they produce output.
The term non-practicing entity seems most appropriate to describe such agentsit is descriptive and neutralalthough it might be interpreted to also include universities or individual inventors who do not commercialize their own inventions. Our denition explicitly excludes both, because they directly engage in innovation.
In reality there is no single entity that exemplies all NPEs. These rms use a large array of dierent business models: they buy dierent kinds of patents and source their portfolios from dierent kinds of inventors, they employ dierent bargaining, licencing and litigation strategies. We do not attempt to study all of these dierent business models. Rather, we focus on a particular kind of NPE, which have been called pure patent assertion entities (PAE) in Scott Morton and Shapiro (2013) . We isolate the impact of one specic NPE business model and study how patent trade involving such an NPE aects the rate of innovation. There is no doubt that NPEs in general play a complex role in the current system, aecting the equilibrium through a number of dierent channels. Incorporating all of these arguments in a single formal model is challenging, especially if we want to draw economic insights that might help the discussion of the role of NPEs in the system.
1 Instead, we study a model which includes, in our opinion, the most important features of the modern patent system, and which is rich enough to allow us to talk explicitly about the ultimate equilibrium eects on the incentives for innovation.
We propose a theoretical model to study the eects of NPEs on licencing, litigation, and, most importantly, 1 Moreover, the implications of some of the arguments that have been put forth can be easily understood without a formal model, and they can easily be incorporated in one. See, for example, McDonough (2006) .
on innovation, which we think is necessary in order to evaluate their role in the economy. In contrast, much of the public debate has so far been driven by appeals to what seems good or bad on the basis of vague ideas of how the patent system should operate. To us, as economists, it seems clear that the issues surrounding NPEs should be studied from the perspective of how they aect incentives, and with an eye to the optimal design of the patent and litigation systems.
A preview of our results
Our contribution to the literature is to explain the existence of NPEs in a frictionless environment and discuss their eect on the rate of innovation. We rst explain the mechanism through which an NPE can make positive prot in the market, and then provide a formal exposition of its eect on the incentives for R&D. It has been argued that because NPEs extract revenue from producing rms, they must be harming innovation. We show that, even when it is true that NPEs extract surplus from producing rms, they could have a positive eect on innovation under certain conditions. This is because once the research stage is endogenized, forward looking rms will exert more eort to have a larger portfolio and capture the increased marginal value of patenting a discovery. As a consequence of the equilibrium behavior of rms, the innovation rate increases.
We show that, under certain conditions, NPEs decrease the surplus that producing rms receive as a result of their R&D, as one might have expected. But, perhaps counter-intuitively, they do so in a way that actually increases the incentives to exert research eort, and therefore NPE activity leads to a higher rate of innovation in the economy. Specically: by buying existing patents, NPEs induce an equilibrium where the patent holders sell licences under the threat of increased litigation, which is only credible because of the presence of NPEs. This translates into lower prots for follower rms with smaller patent portfolios, 2 and hence the incremental value of patenting a discovery (and therefore the return to R&D eort) increases.
Thus we explicitly show that the idea that NPEs are bad because they extract rents from producing rms is generally incomplete and overly simplistic. Incorporating an endogenous research stage allows us to show precisely how changes in the continuation game drive innovation incentives.
On the other hand, we also show that under some conditions NPEs may eectively act as an entry deterrent, by allowing a dominant rm to leverage its patent portfolio and block entry by competitors into the nal product market. In the latter case the incentives for innovation also increase, just as in the former case, but the eect of the NPE on overall welfare is likely to be negative, due to the increased likelihood of monopolization. Overall, the main contributions of this paper are: to carefully study a particular kind of NPE business model; to show that the eect of NPEs in the patent system might be positive, even when they extract surplus from producing rms; to expose the incompleteness of some commonly heard arguments about patent acquistions and patent privateering.
2 And, moreover, NPE activity only matters in cases where the producing rms have asymmetric portfolios.
Some key features of our model
The rst challenge to a theoretical model of NPEs is to dene an environment in which NPEs have a reason to exist, i.e. one where they can make prots in equilibrium. This can certainly be accomplished in a model where the NPE has some exogenously given (and thus somewhat articial) advantage over the typical producing rm. One could consider a model of litigation where NPEs have lower legal costs, and therefore alter the equilibrium of the patent system; such lower costs can be taken as a maintained assumption or derived through some form of economies of scale in litigation, but in either case it is not clear why a producing rm would be unable to replicate exactly the strategy of an NPE, for instance by employing its patent management division as if it were an NPE. Alternatively, one could consider a model where rms search through a pool of patents in order to establish which ones their products might infringe
upon, or what the prior art is for a new invention, and consider the case where NPEs have lower search costs (Biglaiser (1993) ). Rather than endowing the NPE with some inherent advantage, we will consider a model where all entities are identical in terms of their litigation and licensing opportunities and show that NPEs can indeed make positive prots in equilibrium and aect the outcomes of producing rms.
In other words, we can explain the existence of NPEs in a model without any technological frictions, and thus the insights of this paper are more transparent and intuitive.
Our model captures some of the key features of the current state of the patent system. First, our model considers trade in strong, but probabilistic patents. They are strong in the sense that litigation against a rm which infringes on a patent would still be protable after taking into consideration legal costs. We do not model patents whose litigation value would be negative.
3 Notice that in general a patent may have negative value in a one-shot game and yet have positive value in a repeated game, because the patent holder may want to establish a reputation for enforcing such patents. 4 In our model litigation is a one-shot interaction and the threat of litigation is credible. Hence we do not attempt to study the issues of weak patents or what one might call spurious invention, as other papers have explored. However, our main intuition could be embedded into a model that also incorporates the patent thicket problem. Second, our model makes no distinction between large and small rms. We simply model a producing rm as an entity which invests in its own R&D, obtains patents on its inventions, and has the option to licence or sell its patents, and to litigate against alleged infringers. An NPE, on the other hand, is a rm which has no capacity to develop an invention or to produce a nal good, but may trade in patents and engage in licencing and litigation on the basis of its portfolio. We study licencing in the shadow of litigation. That is, when a patent holder oers a producing rm a licence, all parties will rationally take into consideration what their actual payos would be if they do not agree on a licence price. Therefore the licence that they agree on may reect some counter-factual litigation costs, and not just the pure value of the invention itself.
3 A patent may have negative litigation value because the legal cost of litigation outweighs the expected value of the rewards that the patent holder would receive from the lawsuit.
4 See Scott Morton and Shapiro (2013) and Hovenkamp (2013) for a discussion of such strategies employed by some NPEs.
Third, in many industries a single patent does not map into a productthis is very much the case in the technology sector, semiconductors, smartphones, etc. This leads to much higher interdependence among producing rms which make products that rely on overlapping pieces of technology, and increases the importance of licensing and litigation among them. Moreover, the complexity of a product and the fact that it relies on many patents held by dierent entities creates the incentive for a rm to trade in patents strategically, in order to defend itself against potential infringement suits or to initiate such against its rivals. Thus, the market for patents itself is more important today than everit matters both because of the traditional role it has served in eciently allocating who should commercialize an invention, and because of its role as an exchange where rms trade strategically in order to exploit arbitrage opportunities in intellectual property. We therefore study a model where rms patent separate components that are necessary to make a product, rather than patenting an entire product as in Lemley and Shapiro (2007) .
Fourth, the complex nature of products and innovations makes it hard to determine with certainty what
should be patentable and what should not, and patents are often granted by the patent oce and later invalidated in court. As Lemley and Shapiro (2005) point out, patents are now essentially probabilistic property rights, or lottery tickets, with many of them being invalidated in court. Moreover, determining whether a particular product infringes on a patent, even if it is a valid patent, is not straightforward.
The boundaries of particular innovations are often blurred (and sometimes deliberately so by the original patent claimant, who may not want to be transparent in terms of what exactly a patent covers), which generates signicant uncertainty as to whether a patent would be found relevant in a lawsuit against an alleged infringer. As in Lemley and Shapiro (2007) , this paper explicitly considers the outcome of any infringement suit as a probabilistic function of the plainti 's patent portfolio, to capture the unpredictability of litigation.
Fifth, our primary goal in this paper is to characterize the eect of a new actor in the intellectual property sphere, NPEs, on the incentives for research and development, which may accrue not just from the commercialization of a patent as part of a product, but also from licensing or litigation. We therefore embed our model of patent trade, licensing, and litigation, into an explicit larger model of the research eorts and investments of competing rms. In other words, we study the process of trading, licensing and suing as a continuation game that follows what is essentially a multi-stage patent race involving several components that are all necessary for the production of a nal good. We thus have a formal model of the incentives that drive innovation, and can discuss how the benets to invention will determine what rms are willing to invest in research, and how this will in turn determine the equilibrium rate of innovation in the economy. This allows us to characterize the eect of NPEs, by comparing the economy's rate of innovation in the benchmark case where they do not exist (or, hypothetically, are not allowed to enforce patents in the same way that a practicing entity is), to the case where they do exist.
Finally, one NPE practice that has been discussed as detrimental to innovation is patent privateering 5 , whereby a producing rm sells part of its portfolio to an NPE and lets it enforce the patents. One reason 5 See Ewing (2012) for an introduction to the topic.
that one might consider privateering detrimental is because an NPE would never cross-license with a producing rm, which could break down a cross-license equilibrium between two producing rms. A rm with a large patent portfolio might obtain a small marginal value from a small part of its portfolio. In that case, selling a small part of its porfolio to an NPE might be optimal from the rm's perspective. A second practice recognized as detrimental is the disaggregation of a patent portfolio, which can generate a royalty stacking problem, whereby an alleged infringer has to pay licenses multiple times because a product infringes on patents owned by dierent parties. Since damages awards are not easily determined, the infringer might be paying more than it should in royalties. We incorporate both of these eects in our model, and while it is true that both practices extract surplus from producing rms with smaller portfolios, we show that this does not necessarily imply a lower rate of innovation.
What comes next
In the next section we discuss why NPEs matter in the patent and litigation system and review some of the literature and the arguments that have been oered for and against NPEs. In section 3 we set up the model of patent trade, licencing and litigation, present the assumptions that we will use in the analysis, and describe the endogenous research stage. Section 4 considers an economy where NPEs do not exist, while Section 5 presents the equilibrium of the model with an NPE. Section 6 contains our main results on patent trade, the impact of an NPE on innovation, and the possibility of entry deterrence. 6 Although such litigation often produces fairly small rewards, ranging between $50,000 and a few million dollars, some of the most well-known cases have resulted in payments in the hundreds of millions of dollars (Hagiu and Yoe (2013) ; Sharma and Clark (2008) Whether the new patent environment that has emerged is benecial or detrimental for innovation has been the subject of much academic and public debate. The patent system is designed with the goal of encouraging innovation by guaranteeing rewards to inventors, so it is natural to evaluate its performance in terms of the incentives for innovation. It is also worth noting that the system was not designed so that only practicing entities would receive patent protection (Denicolò (2007) ; Mazzeo et al. (2011) (2013)).
NPEs are therefore accused of exploiting the uncertainty that is inherent in many patents, especially in industries where the boundaries of a patent may be fuzzy (Agliardi and DSE (2009); Miller (2012) ), and where patents have been dubbed lottery tickets (Lemley and Shapiro (2005) ). Fourth, to the extent that an NPE extracts some fraction of the overall industry surplus as rents, without increasing the size of the total surplus, the NPE may decrease the rewards to innovation and hence weaken the incentives of inventors (Bessen and Meurer (2012) ).
On the other hand, NPEs may enhance innovation if they reward inventors who would otherwise not be able to enforce their patents due to nancing or litigation frictions. If an individual inventor cannot reap the rewards of his eorts due to some imperfection of the system, such as the lengthy and costly nature of trials, then an NPE could potentially buy the patent and either enforce it in litigation, or extract a licensing fee under the threat of litigationsome of which may be passed down to the inventor, thus rewarding innovation in the way that the patent system was originally designed to. Second, NPEs may be good for innovation if they provide valuable liquidity to the market for patents, in the same way that a stock broker provides liquidity to a nancial market. Patents are especially hard to value, since by denition they are fairly unique and lack close substitutes whose market valuation could be used as a proxy for the value of any particular patent. Moreover, they are often traded and licensed privately, and hence even if a patent is traded, its value may not be observable by an outside party. So to the extent that NPEs increase the number of trades in the patent market, they may help overcome this informational friction 7 .
Generally speaking, it is not clear why the enforcement of patents should per se be considered a bad phenomenon. Litigation has always been part of the patent system as an enforcing mechanism. It is of course costly 8 , but it is a necessary evil, since it provides a credible threat to deter imitators from extracting part of the inventor's reward 9 . Whether the compensation for an inventor's research eorts and investments come directly through licensing or litigation on the inventor's part, or through an intermediary entity which conducts these activities on the inventor's behalf, is irrelevant in and of itselfin fact, it matters to the extent that the intermediary may weakly increase the rewards to the inventors, since the latter always have the option of not trading their patents.
Related Literature
In recent years there have been several studies that try to understand the nature of non-practising entities.
The literature on NPEs can be divided into two main categories: essays written by law scholars, and papers written by economists, both empirical and theoretical. Most of what is written about NPEs are essays that try to justify why NPEs are either benecial or detrimental for the economy. A summary of this discussion can be found in Risch (2012) and Lemley and Melamed (2013 Pohlmann and Opitz (2013) ). One of the most common approaches to tackling the problem in empirical papers is to compare the patent porfolio of a producing entity against that of a nonproducing entity, and draw conclusions about whether NPEs are good or bad based on their dierences. For example, Love (2011) studies the age of patents litigated by practicing and non-practicing patentees. Jeruss et al. (2012) shows that litigation by NPEs is increasing and that 7 Of course, many patent trades involving an NPE are conducted in secrecy, and this argument would not apply to those.
8 As of 2011, according to the American Intellectual Property Law Association, for a claim that could be worth less than a $1 million, median legal costs are $650,000. When the claims range from $1 to $25 millions, the median litigation costs are $2.5 million. And for claims over $25 million, the median legal costs are $5 million. Beside these costs, the median duration of litigation is about 2.5 years.
9 Consider the case between Apple and Samsung in August 2012. After the two rms did not reach an agreement, Samsung was initially ordered to pay $1.05B USD in damages to Apple.
they settle early in the litigation process (See also Chien (2008)). Risch (2012) shows evidence that some empirical results are reversed, by using a dierent dataset. Lerner (2006) studies litigation, in particular by NPEs, in the nancial sector. Lemley and Melamed (2013) There are not many papers drawing conclusions about the eect of NPEs on innovation based on a theoretical model. Given the complexity of the problem, there are many second order eects that might be hidden behind complex interactions. There has been some work on the eect of intermediaries on innovation, and some of this literature is reviewed in Howells (2006) . Closer to our model is Bessen and Meurer (2006) , although its focus is on litigation, rather than the rate of innovation. Perhaps the closest literature to our paper is the one that studies the role of a middleman (Biglaiser (1993) ; Rust and Hall (2002) ). However, the question here is dierent and we do not assume any special technology for the middleman. Also related to our paper is the literature on patent thickets, which develops after Shapiro (2000) . Apart from these papers, as far as we know, there is no theoretical model that provides economic insights on the eect of NPEs on the rate of innovation.
whether a`copied' component infringes on the patented one. When a rm patents a new component or technology, its competitor could freely and immediately imitate or invent around it. Because of the imperfection of the patent system, a copied component will not obviously be seen as an infringement on the original inventor's patent. If a competitor were to sell the nal product using a copied component, the patent holder could oer a license contract to the imitator. Throughout our analysis we assume that the license contract is one where the patent holder receives a one time fee L from the imitator, for the right to use the component. The imitator may then accept or reject this contract. If the contract has been rejected, the patent owner decides whether to sue for infringement or do nothing.
Crucial to our results are the assumptions about the litigation process: costs, court decisions and penalties.
Every time a rm goes to court, it has to pay a xed legal cost c, which includes lawyers costs, preparation of the case, time in court, etc. This cost is paid by all the parties involved in a trial and the amount c is assumed to be independent of the number of infringement claims. This is the key assumption of our model, which is also a common assumption in the patents pool literature. The outcome of a trial is determined by the court and, as we noted above, we focus on an industry where patents have fuzzy boundaries. That is, a court cannot with perfect accuracy recognize whether an imitation infringes on the original patent. We introduce this uncertainty in our model as a random court verdict. With probability β ∈ (0, 1) a copied component infringes on the patented one, and with probability 1 − β it does not 12 . We assume that all court decisions are independent.
The way the courts award damages to a plainti are key to our conclusions. Unfortunately, there is no general and simple formula that can be used to award damages, and in many cases these are contingent on the specic details of a case. However, in most cases there are two elements that contribute to the nal compensation to the plainti: reasonable royalties and fees per product. Reasonable royalties correspond to forgone royalties for the patent holder, had the infringer bought a license in the rst place. These are often the most important part and amount to up to 80% of the nal damages. The other component in our model is a per-product fee, which captures any additional damages beyond reasonable royalties awarded to a patent holderthese could include, for example, foregone prots.
We assume the following damages awards. If a producing rm infringes on two patents held by the plainti, the damages award is F + 2R. Reasonable royalties are paid per component infringed, whereas the`xed' component is paid once for any product which has been found to infringe. If the rm infringes on only one component, the award is F + R.
Besides the damages award, a patent owner could seek to exclude a rival o the market through an 12 More generally, we can interpret β as a belief about how strong the patent portfolio of the rm is. In reality rms often own large portfolios of patents, so there might be other patents w, z that can be used in court against x or y. Since rms may be unaware of the complete portfolio of their rivals, or it may be very costly to know exactly what each one of the claims is protecting, we can interpret β as the probability of winning the lawsuit, accounting for the court's inherently random decision, plus uncertainty regarding the complete portfolio of the rivals. Finally, we assume that the outcomes of dierent patent infringement lawsuits are independent events.
injunction. Although not granted very often, injunctions do play a role in the enforcement of IP when the patent holder is a producing rm. Historically, NPEs used to be treated similarly until the 2006 eBay vs Motorola decision, following which NPEs are no longer awarded injunctions. Today the only way for an NPE to get an injunction is generally through the ITC, which is also not very common. Therefore in our model we rule out the possibility of injunctions for NPEs.
13 On the other hand, in lawsuits involving two producing rms the plainti may be awarded an injunction against its competitor, with probability I.
The nal ingredient of our model is the timing of the actions. First is the research stage where rms invest in order to make discoveries. Once all discoveries are made and the patent portfolios are determined, trade between rms and the NPE takes place in the form of take it or leave it oers by the patent owner 14 . Our model assumes no commitment on the rm side: if a rm sold its entire patent portfolio to a competitor, the rm cannot commit to stay out of the market. Thus even if one rm acquired the patents for both components, the competitor could still enter the market and risk infringement. This feature allows us to have a model where the solution is not the trivial one: one rm buys up all the patents and produces as a monopolist 15 . Following any patent trades, rms decide whether to enter the nal product market, patent owners oer licences to entrants, and any potential litigation takes place following licence rejections.
Assumptions
We operate under ve assumptions that guarantee our results.
16 These conditionsdealing with the nature of competition, litigation, licensing and entryguarantee: 1) that industry prots would be maximized by a monopoly regime; 2) litigation is protable when a rm or an NPE's license oer is rejected; 3) rms and the NPE prefer to extract surplus through licensing rather than litigation; 4) entry in the nal product market is protable. Besides that, for simplicity we assume that the damage award in a lawsuit is the same for rms and the NPE, 17 though we have shown that analogous results hold when we allow damages to dier systematically.
Our rst assumption regards the structure of the nal product market. We assume that a monopoly earns larger prots than total industry prots under competition. We assume that whatever prots the industry can sustain as a duopoly should also be attainable by a monopolist, who can exactly replicate the actions of each rm in a duopoly (including, for example, by producing multiple dierentiated products).
The second assumption is over the gains from litigation. Since litigation is costly it will be a credible 13 This is not important for the overall conclusion of this paper. An earlier version of the paper treats producing and non-producing rms identically, including injunctions for both, and yields analogous conclusions.
14 This TIOLI assumption is not crucial and we elaborate on this point in the Appendix.
15 There may also be other reasons why this would not be a satisfying assumption, e.g. anti-trust concerns.
16 We have a more detailed solution of the game for a general set of parameters, but here we restrict to this set of assumptions for the sake of exposition. The full analysis is available upon request.
17 I.e. a successful plainti would receive F + k · R, regardless of whether it is a producing rm or not, for a xed k.
threat only when its expected payo is positive.
Assumption 2. (Litigation) c ≤ β(F + R).
Next, we assume that, whenever possible, rms would prefer to agree on licenses rather than go to costly litigation. We want litigation to be a credible threat that does not occur on the equilibrium path. In order for this to happen, we impose a condition that compares the costs and gains from litigation.
We impose a condition on entry. If a market can sustain only one rm there is nothing interesting to analyze. Therefore we assume that duopoly prots are high enough so entry is attractive for both rms.
Under these conditions we study the eect of an NPE on the equilibrium payos. For the sake of exposition we restrict attention to the case where the NPE has all the bargaining power. However, this is not crucial to the results and Appendix C generalizes the results when the NPE has only partial bargain power.
Finally, we assume one last condition, which guarantees that a rm which owns both patents is willing to sell one of them to the NPE:
Remark: There is a non-empty set of parameters for which these conditions simultaneously hold. This is easy to see when I → 0.
Description of the Research Stage
We borrow from the models of multi-stage innovation to describe the research process. Firms will invest to discover the two components required to sell the product. We do not assume that research investments have to be sequential, since in principle the two components are two unrelated pieces of technology. Thus, we do not require rms to nish one stage before starting the next one. Initially, rms decide how much eort to exert on the discovery of each component. Eort is costly and rms share the same cost function c(e) which is increasing and convex. Depending on the rm's eort, success arrives according to an exponential random variable. If at t = 0 rm i allocates an amount of eort x i to discover one component, the unconditional probability of an arrival before time τ is given by 1 − exp(−x i τ ).
Since there is no learning and the exponential distribution is memoryless, we focus on a Markov perfect equilibrium, where the state is given by the history of discoveries. Each rm will revise their eort decisions only when there is a new discovery, which is publicly known. Since rms and components are modeled symmetrically, there are essentially only two possible patent landscapes: 1) when one rm owns both patents, i.e has the patent portfolio {x, y}, and the rival has an empty portfolio ∅; 2) when each rm one patent (for example when rm 1's portfolio is {x} and rm 2's portfolio is {y}).
In the following sections we analyze the subsequent stages: patent acquisition, litigation, licensing agreements and court outcomes in order to determine the value of a given patent portfolio. Once we determine the value of each patent portfolio, we can use it as an input in the research stage to determine the eort exerted by each rm.
We analyze two cases. In the rst case there are no NPEs in the economy. That is, there are no rms acting as an intermediary, buying patents and selling licenses under the threat of litigation. In the second case, we introduce an NPE and we allow patent transactions between producing rms and the NPE.
An economy without NPEs
Suppose rms can only trade patents amongst themselves after the discoveries are made, and in the continuation game they sell licenses or litigate according to strategies that are subgame perfect. Because rms are`anonymous' in our model, it is enough to focus on two subgames:
Game 1:
Firm 1 owns both patents, i.e has the patent portfolio {x, y}, and rm 2 has an empty portfolio ∅.
Game 2: Each rm owns one patent: rm 1's portfolio is {x} and rm 2's portfolio is {y}.
We use the subgame perfect equilibrium concept to calculate the payos from these two games. In what follows we lay out the structure of each subgame and study the equilibrium under the assumptions that we stated above. The full analysis of each subgame, for any parameter values, is available, but not included here for the sake of exposition.
Game 1
This subgame starts after rm 1 has just become the owner of both patents. {x, y}
Where π i,S is the rm i's payo after a one component lawsuit and π i,SS is rm i's payo after a two component lawsuit.
Analysis of Game 1
We solve the subgame by backward induction. Suppose rm 2 rejects both contracts and rm 1 decides to sue on both components. Our assumptions on damages is that rm 1 gets F if some component is infringed by the rival's product, plus R in reasonable royalties for each infringed component. In addition, with probability I an injunction is granted against the infringer and, as a consequence, rm 2 has to leave the market. The cost of a trial is c, independent of the number of patents brought in the law suit.
Therefore the payos of a two component law suit are given by:
When rm 2 rejected both licenses there are three possible suing strategies that rm 1 could implement:
Suing on both components in the same trial, suing in two separate simultaneous trials, or suing both component in sequential trials.
Suing for both components in the same trial avoids the royalty stacking problem, since the xed component of the damages award F will be paid only once. Therefore, the payo for rm 1 is
But if rm 1 les two simultaneous independent law suits, it doubles its potential xed payment F , as well as the cost c. In this case, the payo for rm 1 is:
Finally, the other posibility is to sue once for infringement on one component, and after learning the outcome of that trial, decide whether to sue again (which will only happen if rm 2 has not been excluded through an injunction). In this case rm 1's payo is
It is easy to see that π 1,SS ≥ π 1,Sue1 ⇔ c ≥ β 2 F and it's always true that π 1,SS ≥ π 1,Seq . 18 Our main result does not depend crucially on this strategic decision, and we will restrict attention to the case where rm 1 sues for both components in one trial, i.e. c ≥ β 2 F .
Consider the case where rm 2 accepted one license and infringed on the other component, and rm 1 decided to sue on that component. In this case, the payos are given by:
Firm 1 prefers to sue on both components rather than none i π 1,SS ≥ π d , equivalent to
If rm 2 accepted only one license, rm 1 prefers to sue on the remaining component rather than not i
18 Anecdotical evidence suggests that there is an increasing amount of communication among courts and they may deny double awards for lawsuits led in dierent courts.
Assumption 2 guarantees that these two conditions above hold. Thus rm 1 will always sue after rm 2 rejected any the contract.
Consider the contract (L 1 , L 2 ), knowing that rm 1 will sue rm 2 if a contract is rejected. We dene the following auxilliary variables:
Figure 3. Continuation strategy of rm 2, for a given license contract.
Accepts 1 and rejects 2 if
Accepts 2 and rejects 1 if
Rejects both if
By oering a contract rm 1 is choosing the payo of the subsequent stage.
If rm 1 wants rm 2 to accept both contracts, the best it can do is to
If rm 1 wants rm 2 to accept contract i and reject the other one, the best it can do is to oer L * i = γ and L * −i > α. If rm 1 wants rm 2 to reject both contracts, the best it can do is to
Notice that rm 1 always prefers rm 2 to reject both contracts rather than accept only one. The most rm 1 can extract from rm 2 by making rm 2 accept one contract and reject the other one is γ.
The intuition behind this result is the economies of scale in law suits plus the injunction possibility. The infringer pays the same cost c when sued on two components or only one. Therefore, the license that rm 1 can extract from rm 2 does not compensate the gain of suing on both components: it increases the probability of injunction and does not raise the litigation cost.
Next, rm 1 prefers that rm 2 accept both contracts instead of rejecting them i
These conditions are guaranteed by Assumption 3. Given that licenses are chosen optimally for rm 1, they make rm 2 indierent between accepting or rejecting both contracts. Firm 2 will decide to enter if and only if it makes non negative prots. We have the following entry condition:
Assumption 4 guarantees that entry is protable. Therefore, the equilibrium is: Firm 2 enters and rm 1 oers contracts that are accepted. Payos are
Game 2 This is the subgame where the two components have been discovered by dierent rms, and each rm holds one patent. Without loss of generality, we assume rm 1 owns the patent for x, while rm 2 owns that for y. 
Sue
Not Sue
If both rms sue each other they have an expected payo of:
one rm sues and the other rm does not, the expected payos are, respectively:
Assumption 3 guarantees that π S,S < π d and Assumption 2 guarantees that π S,S > π N S,S which implies that (S, S) is the unique equilibrium in the litigation game 19 . Therefore, rms never want to reach the litigation stage and the unique equilibrium is that rms will cross-license and the payos are π d for both rms.
NPE as a third player
In this section we study the same model of R&D and competition, but we introduce an NPE as a new player. As pointed out in the introduction the NPE will only dier from a rm in that it has no capacity to do R&D or to produce a product. Initially, it does not own patents and it can only resort to patent trade to make prots. After the rms make the discoveries, the NPE may oer a contract to buy a patent, including a grant-back clause. This contract establishes a buying price p, plus a non-exclusive licensing 19 Another way to rule out the litigation outcome is to assume that countersuing is free (or much cheaper than c) deal with rm i. In the following four sections we analyze all possible licensing and litigation subgames, depending on which entity owns which patent (we call these subgames A,B, C and D).
Game A Consider the game where the NPE owns both patents, and it acquired both of them from rm 1. The patent portfolios are then: NPE={x, y}, rm 1=∅, rm 2=∅, while patent protection is: rm 1={x, y}, rm 2=∅. Patent protection refers to the grant-back clauses that we assume are included in a trade involving an NPE.
Firm 1 will always enter the market, since in the worse case it gets π d + p 1 + p 2 . Firm 2 has to decide to enter or not. If it chooses to enter, the NPE will oer it a menu of licenses, (L x , L y ), one for each patent.
If any license is rejected, the NPE has the option to sue rm 2 for infringement. The NPE owns both patents and acquired them from rm 1. between rms and the NPE is that the NPE does not receive injunctions 20 . As before, the cost of a trial is c, independent of the number of patents brought in the law suit. 
Given license contracts (L 1 , L 2 ), the regions of acceptance and rejection for rm 2 are analogous to the ones in gure 3, in the analysis of game 1, except that we need to replace α byα, γ byγ andα byα.
Thus, as in game 1, the NPE can choose the payos by deciding the license contract. Notice, however, a dierence between rms and the NPE. Since the NPE does not get injunctions, it is indierent between getting one or two license contracts accepted. The most the NPE can extract in licensing both component isα, and the NPE prefers the two licenses to be accepted rather than to sue on both of them iα = c + β[(2 − β)F + 2R] ≥α − 2c, which always holds.
Firm 2 will enter only if the entry condition π d ≥ c + β(2 − β)F + 2βR holds. Assumption 4 guarantees this is the case. Thus, the equilibrium of the subgame is: Firm 2 enters, the NPE oer licenses that are accepted and the payos are
Game B
Consider the game where the NPE owns both patents, and it acquired one from rm 1 and one from rm 2. The patent portfolios are then: NPE={x, y}, rm 1=∅, rm 2=∅, while patent protection is: rm 1={x}, rm 2={y}.
Firms 1 and 2 rst simultaneously decide whether to enter or not.
20 We have also explored the case where a producing rm can be excluded with an injunction when the patent holder is an NPE. The main result of our paper is unchanged. 
Consider the subgame where both rms have entered. The NPE is going to make oers L y to rm 1 and L x to rm 2. The rms then simultaneously choose whether to get a license from the NPE or not. If they decide not to, the NPE decides whether to sue the infringers or not. 
Analysis of Game B
If a rm rejects the NPE's licence oer, the NPE would sue if and only if c ≤ β(F + R) (Assumption 2), regardless of whether the other rm accepted or rejected a licence.
Suppose both rms entered. Notice that each rm's decision to accept or reject the NPE's licence oer is independent of whether the other rm accepts or rejects the oer it is given by the NPE. In particular, rm i's payo from accepting the NPE's licence at price L is π d − L, while its payo from rejecting it is π d − β(F + R) − c. Therefore, the NPE's optimal licences are such that each rm is made indierent between accepting and rejecting it. This is L * = β(F + R) + c. The only way for the NPE to earn prots is by selling licenses. Therefore, the equilibrium payos are:
Suppose only one rm entered. As in the previuos case the NPE oers a license at price L * = β(F + R) + c and its accepted. Suppose rm i entered and rm j stayed out. The equilibrium payos are:
If no rm entered, the equilibrium payos are π 1 = p 1 , π 2 = p 2 and π N P E = −p 1 − p 2 .
Next, consider the rms' entry decisions. Assumption 4 guarantees that π d ≥ c + β(F + R) and therefore, in equilibrium: Both rms enter, the NPE oers licenses L * = β(F + R) + c to each rm and they accept.
The equilibrium payos are:
Game C
Consider the game where the NPE owns the patent for x and it was acquired from rm 1, while rm 2 owns the patent for y. The patent portfolios are then: NPE={x}, rm 1=∅, rm 2={y}, while patent protection is: rm 1={x}, rm 2={y}.
Firms simultaneously decide whether to enter or not, then license oers are made simultaneously, and nally potential litigation decisions are made simultaneously. 
If only rm 1 enters, then rm 2 makes a licensing oer under the threat of litigation. If only rm 2 entered, the NPE makes the licensing oer.
Analysis of Game C
The lawsuits by rm 2 and the NPE are strategically independent of each other. Assumption 2 implies β(F + R) > c, so litigation is credible for the NPE, and β(F + R) + βI(π m − π d ) > c, so it is also credible for rm 2.
Suppose both rms entered. The highest licenses that will be accepted are L * N = β(F + R) + c for the NPE and L * 2 = β(F + R + Iπ d ) + c for rm 2. The NPE will always want its license to be accepted.
However rm 2 might prefer to litigate in order to exclude rm 1 o the market through an injunction.
Firm 2 prefers to oer a licence of L * 2 to rm 1 if and only if
This condition holds by Assumption 3.
Suppose only rm 1 entered. Even when rm 1 infringes on rm 2's patent, since rm 2 is not producing, there will be no injunction. Therefore, the maximum rm 2 can oer is L * 2 − βIπ d to rm 1. In this case, rm 2's license will always be oered and accepted.
Suppose only rm 2 entered. The NPE oers a licence L * N to rm 2 and it will be accepted.
Therefore, if both rms entered, rm 2 and the NPE sell licenses that are accepted and the equilibrium payos are:
If only rm 1 entered: , π
Therefore, entry is a dominant strategy for
. Notice that Assumption 4 implies both conditions. Therefore, the unique equilibrium is both rms enter and license oers are accepted, so payos
Game D
Consider the game where the NPE owns the patent for x and it was acquired from rm 1, while rm 1 owns the patent for the second component y. The patent portfolios are then: NPE={x}, rm 1={y}, rm 2=∅, while patent protection is: rm 1={x, y}, rm 2=∅.
Firm 1 will decide to enter, because the lowest payo it can guarantee itself is π d + p 1 . Firm 2 decides whether enter, and if it does, rm 1 and the NPE make simultaneous oers for the patents. If oers are rejected, each entity can decide whether to sue for infringement or not. The key dierence between a lawsuit from rm 1 versus one from the NPE is the injunction assumption. 
None

Not enter Enter
Analysis of Game D
The payos under our assumptions are:
21
• If rm 2 rejects both L N and L 1 :
• If rm 2 accepts L N and rejects L 1 :
• If rm 2 rejects L N and accepts L 1 :
• If rm 2 accepts both L N and L 1 :
Notice that because the NPE is never awarded with injunctions, the suing decision of the NPE does not aect the market structure. Therefore, the suing decision by rm 1 and the NPE are strategically independent. No matter what strategy the NPE plays, rm 1 will sue rm 2 on one component after the rejection of a license contract if and only if c ≤ β[F + R + I(π m − π d )]. The NPE will sue rm 2 after the rejection of a license contract i c ≤ β(F + R). Assumption 2 guarantees these conditions hold. Here we can see that the incentives to sue for the rm and the NPE are dierent. In particular, the NPE has always less incentives to sue than rm 1. This is, for β(
will sue after a rejection but the NPE will not. Thus, the injunction allows rm 1 to charge more. Under Assumption 2, the rm and the NPE will sue after a rejection.
For given licenses (L 1 , L N ) rm 2's optimal choices are: Accept the license from 1 i L 1 ≤ α and accept the license from the NPE i L N ≤α.
Notice the NPE always want its license to be accepted, because it getsα and going to trial givesα − 2c.
Firm 1, however, would want to litigate under some conditions. This is because through litigation rm 1 can obtain a market advantage via an injunction decision. Firm 1 would prefer to sell a license and obtain α rather than litigate i c ≥ 1 2 βI(π m − 2π d ).
Assumption 3 guarantees this condition holds. This equation expresses the trade o between going to trial
and selling a license. It can be written as:
The term c+βIπ d represents the amount rm 1 can extract from rm 2 from the threat of litigation. Since we assume TIOLI oers, rm 2 is willing to pay to avoid the litigation costs and the risk of infringement.
The term βI(π m − π d ) correponds to rm 1's injunction benet. Therefore, rm 1 will rather get licenses 21 Suppressing the p1, p2 payments for this part of the analysis, since at this point they are sunk.
if the benet from litigation is smaller than the direct cost of litigation c plus the opportunity cost of selling a license c + βIπ d .
Finally, rm 2 decides to enter or not. Firm 2 will enter if and only if π d > α +α, which is implied by Assumption 4.
Results
Patent Trade
Under Assumptions 1 to 5, we have the equilibrium strategies and payos in each subgame.
22 We now study the trading of patents between producing rms and the NPE.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1-5, the NPE will buy exactly one patent if one rm discovered both components, and none otherwise. In that case, the NPE's eect on equilibrium payos is to decrease the payo of the rm that has no patents.
Proof. The details of the proof are in Appendix B. When we consider Games 1, A and D, under our assumptions the NPE makes TIOLI oers and buys one patent from the rm that owns both components.
The price is such that rm 1 is indierent between selling a patent and keeping both.
23 The NPE's payo is strictly positive and equal to π N P E = β 2 F + c − β(1 − β)Iπ d , while the payo of rm 1 remains the same. The payo of rm 2 is reduced relative to its payo in the absence of an NPE. We nd that this is the only case in which the NPE aects the equilibrium payos.
In Games 2, B, and C, it is clear that the NPE can at best (and at worst) break even by buying patents and licensing. In particular, no rm can increase its own and the NPE's joint prot by trading patents. So regardless of how much trade occurs, the nal payos in all these three cases are
Intuition for this result: Although the NPE is endowed with the same capacity to litigate as a producing rm, we are able to nd a mechanism through which the NPE makes positive prots, in the case where one rm discovers both components. Imagine that rm 1 owns the patents for both components. Because of the cost savings in trials for multiple components, plus the fact that suing in separate trials is not a credible threat, the license reects rm 2's willingness to pay up to avoid the litigation cost c. However, when rm 1 sells one patent to the NPE, rm 2 now faces a credible litigation threat from two dierent parties. Firm 2 will now buy licenses from both parties to avoid the litigation cost c from each one of 22 We analyzed each game for an arbitrary set of parameters. These computations have been omitted for the sake of exposition, but are available upon request.
23 Notice that the NPE can at best break even if it buys both patents at a price that keeps rm 1 indierent. That is, the NPE and rm 1 cannot increase their joint prots if they trade both patents.
them. Hence, unbundling patent ownership increases the total surplus that can be extracted from rm 2. This is the patent privateering eect. A second way that the NPE makes positive prots is by charging the fee F which is paid once per product to the suing rm. If rm 2 infringes on both patents, which occurs with probability β 2 , the damages award per product entitles rm 1 to a payment of F . However, when the patents are owned by both rm 1 and the NPE and rm 2 infringes on both patents, the damages award per product F has to be paid to two parties, increasing by F the willingness to pay for licenses. This is the royalty stacking eect.
These two eects combined allow the NPE to extract c+β 2 F from licenses, which rm 1 would not extract if it kept both patents. The drawback of selling one patent is that the NPE cannot get an injunction. This decreases the willingness to pay of rm 2 for a license from the NPE. This eect is evident when only the component sold to the NPE is infringed by rm 2 (which occurs with probability β(1 − β)). Therefore, the condition β 2 F + c > β(1 − β)Iπ d guarantees that the extra licensing revenue that can be obtained by disaggregating the patent portfolio is larger than the loss in the license fee by the NPE due to the lack of injunctions.
The Research Stage
We can now see what is the eect of the NPE on the research eorts. The impact of the NPE is to increase the dierence between winning and losing for the rm that is behind. As a consequence, the rm without discoveries after the rst stage exerts more eort to discover the second component when the NPE exists.
In equilibrium, the extra eort of rm 2 impacts the eort of rm 1 in such a way that aggregate eort always increases. Going back to the initial stage, the continuation values again increase the dierence between being the rst rm to discover some component and not. Thus, the equilibrium eort in the rst stage also increases. We summarize the main result of the section in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The eect of an NPE is to increase the aggregate eort in the research stage.
1. When nothing has been discovered, both rms increase their eort uniformly on each component.
2. When one component is discovered, the rm that has no discoveries puts more eort to discover the second component. The rm that made the discovery can increase or decrease its eort (compared to the case of no NPEs). However, aggregate eort always increases.
The proof comes from a series of Lemmas which we prove in the following two subsections.
Intermediate Stage: One component discovered
In this subsection we assume without loss of generality that rm 1 made the rst discovery. Under our assumptions about litigation, entry and licensing, the continuation values for the game without the NPE are as follows.
• If rm 1 discovers the second component, we have the following:
• If rm 2 discovers the second component, both rms get duopoly prots: V = π d .
In the game with an NPE, the only dierence arises when rm 1 discovers both components. In this case the NPE obtains positive rents from rm 2. Thus the only change under an NPE is the reduction in the continuation value for rm 2 byθ = β(F + R) + c.
Thus, the eect of the NPE can be analyzed as the eect of the change of one parameter in a game. The parameter would eectively take only two values: θ = 0 representing the absence of NPEs and θ =θ > 0 representing the eect of an NPE. However, we develop a comparative static result for any θ ∈ [0, Θ].
The decision for the rms is how much eort to exert to discover the remaining component. We focus on a pure strategy equilibrium, that is, rm i chooses eort u i ∈ [0, U ], taking the eort choices of rm 2 as given. We model innovation as a Tullock contest, which is equivalent to a patent race without discounting (See for example Corchón (2007) ). We assume that eort is costly and both rms have the same cost
. This assumption is not crucial and can be generalized to any increasing convex cost function, using the comparative static result from Acemoglu and Jensen (2013) .
The rms solve:
Since the objective functions are strictly concave and dierentiable, the best response functions are well dened and they are characterized by the rst order conditions:
Dene L = β(2 − β)(F + Iπ d ) + βR + c, which is the license that the rm with two discoveries can charge to the rm that enters the market without any patents.
Lemma 1. When θ = 0 (NPE does not exist), there are two equilibria: (u 1 , u 2 ) = (0, 0) and
Notice that in these equilibria there is no discouragement eect ; the rm who is the current leader will put the same eort towards the discovery of the second component as the rm that is behind. The result comes from the fact that one of the rms will make a discovery for sure. If we add a small probability that none of the rms make the discovery, the rm that is ahead will put more eort than the rm that is behind.
Lemma 2. When θ > 0 (NPE exist), there are two equilibria: (u 1 , u 2 ) = (0, 0) and (u 1 , u 2 ) > 0, where u 2 = Ku 1 and K > 1.
Remark: The equilibrium aggregate eort, when equilibrium eort is positive, is increasing in θ. In an equilibrium where there is positive eort exerted by the rms, the aggregate eort is given by
This result extends with much more generality than our specication. However, we chose the simple specication for tractability in the next section.
First Stage: Nothing yet discovered
When nothing has been yet discovered, rms are symmetric and each rm decides how much eort to allocate to discovering components x and y. Denote rm i's eorts by u x i , u y i . Similarly to the previous section, the optimal eort choices are given by the solution to Lemma 4. If V * ≥ V * * there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where u x = u y = U * .
The rst result in Lemma 3 implies (by Lemma 4) the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium. The second conclusion in the Lemma 3 is that the dierence in payos between winning and losing is larger with an NPE than without an NPE. Therefore, the eect of the NPE in the continuation game rolls back all the way to the initial research stage, implying that rms will exert more eort than they would have exerted in the absence of the NPE.
Entry Deterrence
One reason why NPEs might have a negative eect on the rate of innovation is entry deterrence. As our model illustrates, the reason why NPEs exist is because they can, jointly with entities which engage in R&D, extract surplus from rms which want to enter the product market but lack the patents necessary to protect themselves against litigation. If industry prots are high enough to sustain such rms, they will enter the product market even at the lower levels of prot driven by the NPE. 
then the rm that made both discoveries can deter the rival rm from entering, even in the absence of an NPE. Thus, in this case entry deterrence occurs by the very nature of the patenting and litigation system, in a world where NPEs did not exist.
So instead we ought to focus on the case where a competitor would enter the product market in the absence of NPEs, but would be deterred from entering by an NPE. The relevant subgames of our model are those where rm 1 (wlog) patents both components: games 1, A and D. First, it is easy to see that subgame
A is in fact irrelevant for the same reasons as before: because rm 1 would never want to sell its entire patent portfolio to the NPE, since this would not produce a larger threat of litigation, and would in fact remove the possibility of an injunction against rm 2. We can now focus on subgames 1 and D.
As discussed above, the NPE acts as an entry deterrent if in its absence rm 2 would enter the nal product market, whereas in its presence rm 2 would not enter. This is the case when
Notice that the region between these two bounds is non-empty if and only if c ≥ 2β
For the remainder of this section we assume that this condition holds, in addition to Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 5.
25 These simply say that industry prots are higher under a monopoly regime, that litigation is a credible threat, and that, all else equal, entities prefer to licence rather than litigate if they can extract the same surplus.
When rm 1 is deciding whether to sell one of its patents to the NPE or not, it chooses between two continuation games: game 1, where equilibrium payos are
with L = β(2 − β)(F + Iπ d ) + 2βR + c, and game D, where the equilibrium payos are
The latter is the case where by selling one of its patents to the NPE, rm 1 drives rm 2's potential prots so low that rm 2 does not enter. To have trade in patents we require rm 1 to be willing to sell and the 24 This is the case when our Assumption 4 holds, corresponding to the entry condition in Game D.
25 These condition are compatible as for I = 0 they can all be satised simultaneously.
NPE willing to buy. Therefore, we require
Thus, when π m is very large, it is possible to have trade with p 1 ≤ 0. Otherwise, the NPE simply would not buy the patent. Firm 1 needs to be willing to pay to transfer the patent to the NPE. This might seem strange, but there is evidence that it occurs. Patent privateering is exactly this condition: rms pay or transfer part of their portfolio to other entities, notably non producing entities, to enforce their patents.
The analysis above shows that NPEs may allow patent holders to leverage the patent system and obtain larger prots than in the absence of NPEs. Evaluating the welfare eect of NPEs is a more subtle issue than merely calculating their eects on equilibrium prots. First, consider the original purpose of the patent systemto prevent competitors from appropriating the rents that are necessary for a rm to produce innovation in the rst place. In our model a single rm with patents on both components x and y may be able to deter entry on its own, provided the prot of a potential entrant is negative. But as we have shown, NPEs lower the prots of such potential entrants and hence enhance the ability of the inventor to deter entry, above and beyond the extent to which the patent system itself may have been designed to allow the incumbent to do this. In other words, if one thinks that the patent system is optimally designed to reward inventors with some ability to exclude competitors, the eect of NPEs is to strengthen this ability to a level above the optimal one, and thus to provide super-optimal rewards to patenting.
This phenomenon may decrease overall welfare through multiple dierent channels. First, consumer surplus will likely be lower under a monopoly than under a duopoly. In the case where an NPE allows a rm to sustain a monopoly which it would not be able to sustain otherwise, the overall eect of an NPE on welfare may be negative, even though the incentives for innovation may be higher. Second, it may be the case that social surplus is larger when multiple rms, rather than a single one, produce innovations, because of spillovers or because of learning-by-doing.
Extensions
Selling to a third producing rm
In our main model we showed that trade in patents between rms and the NPE occurs only when one of the rms owns patents for both component. The optimal strategy is to sell one of them to the NPE in order to extract a larger surplus from licenses from the rm that does not own patents. We now study the case where the third party is a producing rm which does not do research, rather than an NPE.
There is a strategic dierence between selling patents to a rm with the ability to enter the product market rather than an NPE. The latter operates under the commitment of not entering the product market, while the former could enter the market and become a competitor. Another dierence is the prices that a producing rm is willing to pay to acquire the patent, because the size of the license it can extract from litigation diers from what the NPE can get. This dierence is mostly due to injunctions and due to the fact that market structure changes when the third party enters the product market.
We explore how these dierences operate and we nd conditions under which a producing rm is willing to pay more than the NPE to acquire a patent. To make the analysis clear, we focus on the set of conditions that guarantee that all rms enter the market, litigation is a credible threat, and licenses are accepted in equilibrium. We explore how these dierences operate and we nd conditions under which a producing rm is willing to pay more than the NPE to acquire a patent. To make the analysis clear, we focus on the set of conditions that guarantee that all rms enter the market, litigation is a credible threat, and licenses are accepted in equilibrium.
The third party is labeled as`rm 3', and replaces the role of the NPE in that it does not put eort to research, but can acquire patents from rms 1 and 2, sell licenses after the acquisition, and it can enter the product market. Suppose rm 3 acquired the patent of component x from rm 1. After the acquisition, rms 1, 2 and 3 entered the market. Since rm 2 does not own any patents, and rm 3 only owns the patent for one component, there is a licensing stage. Firm 1 oers simultaneously the licenses L y 2 and L y 3 to rm 2 and rm 3, respectively. Simultaneously, rm 3 oers a license L x to rm 2. Given these oers, rm 2 and rm 3 accept or reject them. Since rm 2 and rm 3 do not observe all the decisions, we assume passive beliefs: upon a deviation from equilibrium oers, rms believe that the oers for their rivals haven't changed.
Proposition 3. When rm 1 owns patents for both components, there is trade in patents between rms 1 and 3 if
Moreove, rm 1 would rather sell the patent for one component to a practicing entity rather than to an
) and the accept/reject decisions accordingly. Let π T denote triopoly prots, K + = π T − c + β(F + R) and K − = π T − c − β(F + R). Appendix D contains the details of the payos after each continuation of acceptance and rejection of the license contracts.
We want to nd conditions to sustain (A,A,A) as an equilibrium with passive beliefs. Firm 3 compares the payo from (A,A,A) with (A,A,R). The maximal license fee that rm 1 can extract is L y 3 = β(F + R + Iπ T ) + c := α T . Firm 2, must prefer (A,A,A) over (R,A,A), (A,R,A) and (R,R,A). With passive beliefs, rm 2 assumes rm 1's oer to rm 3 does not change, and it is therefore accepted. Hence, we require:
There are many ways to divide the surplus. Since we have multiple ways of achieving the equilibrium, let's assume that rm 1
and rm 3 charges L x = S p − f . These oers will be credible if rms 1 and 3 are willing to make them, rather than litigate. Therefore, we require rm 3's payo from (A,A,A) to be larger that its payo under (R,A,A). A sucient condition for this to happen (when f is as large as
Also, we require that rm 1's oers are credible. Therefore, we need (A,A,A) preferred to (A,R,R), (A,R,A) and (A,A,R), from rm 1's perspective. Sucient conditions for this to happen (Assuming that f is as small as possible, f = S P − α T , so the payo of (A,A,A) is exactly S p + π T ) are:
Suppose this condition holds, so (A,A,A) is an equilibrium for any equilibrium in which rm 1 obtains f from the surplus. Then, the equilibrium payos are:
Consider the worst equilibrium outcome for rm 1, which corresponds to f = S p − α T . In that case, the equilibrium payos are:
Will rm 1 sell to rm 3 even in this case? By not selling rm 1 gets a payo of π d +α. Therefore, rm 1 sells one patent to rm 3 i:
Notice the dierence with the NPE case, where the maximal joint license fee that rm 1 and the NPE extracted from rm 2 was 2β(F + R) + 2c + βIπ d . Two producing entities can extract S p = 2β(F + R) + 2c + βI(2 − βI)π T = 2α T − (βI) 2 π T . Therefore, rm 1 and 3 can extract more from rm 2 than rm 1 and the NPE i (2 − βI)π T ≥ π d .
Nash Bargaining over Licences
In this section we extend our model of patent licencing to include bargaining power. Specically, licencing happens in the shadow of litigation, as in our main model, but the hypothetical plainti and defendant have bargaining powers b and 1 − b, respectively, over the surplus that a licencing agreement generates, relative to the players' litigation payos. Our analysis so far has consistently assumed that the plainti in every potential lawsuit is always able to make a take-it-or-leave-it licence oer, which is equivalent to the special case of b = 1. Hence this section generalizes our main result to accommodate the possibility that a patent-holder who threatens to litigate may not capture the entire surplus resulting from licencing instead of litigating. Despite the vast discussion about litigation (Spier (2007)), there is no clear evidence that the planti has more or less bargain power than the defendant. Therefore, our analysis is one of comparative statics over the bargain parameter. Throughout the analysis we will focus on the case where litigation is a credible threat, players prefer to licence rather than litigate if they can extract at least as much surplus, and entry is protable for the producing rms.
Game 1 We focus on the case where an agreement means that both licenses are accepted and a disagreement means that no license is accepted. Under the conditions assumed before, when an agreement is not reached rm 1 will sue rm 2 for infringing both components. Using the Nash bargain solution, we obtain that the optimal licenses for the components are such that:
Under this condition, it is also true that for any value of the bargain parameter b rm 1 will always prefer to license over suing. The entry condition for rm 2 is now easier to satisfy, because it can extract some surplus in the negotiation.
Therefore, in this case, the equilibrium payos are:
Game 2 Consider the continuation game where rm 1 holds a patent on x and rm 2 holds a patent on y, and consider the history where both rms have entered the nal product market. As in the benchmark model, we assume that if the rms do not cross-licence, it is a dominant strategy for each of them to sue. If the rms were to instead oer each other licences, the holder of each patent would be able to extract a b share of the additional surplus generated by avoiding litigation on that patent. Since the rms' patents on x and y are symmetric, and each holds one, they each capture half of the total surplus from cross-licencing both patents instead of litigating on both (b share from the rm's own patent and 1 − b from the rival's patent). So surplus is divided evenly and the nal payos are:
Game A
In this game the NPE bought both patents from rm 1. As in Game 1, we focus on the case where an agreement means that both licenses are accepted and a disagreement means that no license is accepted.
Under the conditions assumed before, when an agreement is not reached rm 1 will sue rm 2 for infringing both components. Using the Nash bargain solution, we obtain that the optimal licenses for the components are such that:
Just like in the baseline model, where the NPE had all the bargain power, the NPE always prefers to sell licenses rather than litigate. Firm 2, on the other hand, obtains larger payos now compared to the baseline model. Thus the entry condition will be easier to satisfy. Hence in equilibrium:
Game B
Consider the continuation game B where rm 1 discovered x, rm 2 discovered y, and the NPE holds both patents, and consider the history where both rms 1 and 2 have entered the nal product market. Under
Assumption 2 the NPE can credibly threaten to sue each rm on the component that it did not discover, if the rm rejects a licence oer. The NPE thus has two hypothetical lawsuits that it could bring. In each lawsuit, the defendant's expected payo would be π d − β(F + R) − c, while the plainti 's incremental payo from that lawsuit would be β(F + R) − c. If the NPE and the rm were to instead agree on a licence L, the Nash bargaining solution would require that the plainti captures b share of the surplus generated from avoiding litigation, which is 2c in total, while the defendant captures the remaining 1 − b.
. So the nal payos are:
Notice that the new entry condition for both rms to enter the product market will be
Consider the continuation game C where rm 1 discovered x, rm 2 discovered y, the NPE holds the patent on x, and rm 2 holds the patent on y, and consider the history where both rm 1 and rm 2 have entered the product market. Under Assumption 2 both rm 2 and the NPE can credibly threaten to litigate. Instead, the NPE may oer a licence L N to rm 2, and rm 2 may oer a licence L 2 to rm 1.
We can now nd what licence price corresponds to bargaining power b for the hypothetical plainti and 1 − b for the hypothetical defendant in each lawsuit.
Consider the licence L 2 which rm 2 will oer to rm 1, based on the patent for component y. If rm 2
were to sue, the payos would be
If they agree on a licence L 2 , the payos will be
surplus generated by avoiding litigation is 2c − βI(π m − 2π d ). By assumption 3 this term is positive and
Next, consider the licence L N that the NPE will oer to rm 2, based on the patent that it holds for component x. If the NPE were to sue, the payos would be
If they agree on a licence L N , the payos will be
surplus generated by avoiding litigation is 2c. We thus have L N = β(F + R) + c − 2c(1 − b). Hence:
Game D
In this game, rm 1 made both discoveries but sold one of its patents to the NPE. Because there is no interaction among lawsuits we can treat them as two independent problems. Then the equilibrium payos are:
Even when the NPE has zero bargain power (b = 0), selling a license is protable by Assumption 2.
To summarize the previous results consider the following notation:
These quantities denote the amount of surplus that a rm buying the license can collect in the bargaining process. They are all positive under our assumptions on the parameters. When b = 1, the buyer has no bargain power. As b moves towards zero the buyer of the license is able to extract positive surplus from the negotiation.
The way in which the bargaining power aects the payos depends on who is making the oer, due to the injunctions. Denote by π G i the equilibrium payo of rm i = 1, 2, N in game G in the benchmark model (TIOLI oers). Under our conditions, all rms buy licenses and there is no litigation on the equilibrium path. The payos are given by:
Game 2:
Game B:
Game C:
Notice that in Game 1, rm 1 losses surplus in the negotiation in both components. Selling one patent to the NPE might be convenient if the NPE loses less in the negotiation than rm 1. However, the NPE can extract only some surplus through the license fee, since the NPE does not get an injunction. In the benchmark case the NPE never bought the two patents because it would lose money. Here, it is even worse, since it loses more money in the negotiation. However, in the benchmark case, it was optimal to sell one component to the NPE to extract more surplus from rm 2. With bargain power, rm 1 loses money keeping both patents, but also the NPE loses money negotiating it. Therefore, there is trade of one patent if and only if:
This region is not empty as long as
By assumption 5, this condition holds for b = 1. But, we can see that for b < 1 this condition could be violated. In that case, there is no trade in patents. The NPEs will not play a role in the case of a single owner.
Conclusion
This paper primarily considers the question: how do non-practicing entities change the incentives for innovation? To answer this question we study a model where: 1) rms rst invest eort in research, which determines their subsequent patent portfolios; 2) rms (including NPEs) then trade in patents, engage in licensing, and litigate against alleged infringers. Our model captures many important features of today's intellectual-property-based economy, particularly ones which are most salient in the industries where NPEs have emerged as very active participants. First, we consider patents for innovations which do not cover the entirety of a product. Instead, a product in our model consists of multiple components which may be discovered and patented by dierent entities. Second, patents themselves are inherently uncertainif a rm initiates litigation the outcome of the suit is random and the probability of success is a function of the rm's total patent portfolio. This captures the idea that patents in many industries tend to have fuzzy boundaries and therefore litigation outcomes may be less predictable. Third, we embed our discussion of trade, licensing and litigation into an ex-ante innovation race, where rms decide how much to invest in new discoveries, anticipating the future rewards that accrue from product sales and patent trade and licensing. This R&D stage is essentially a patent race for multiple patents, similar to the standard patent race model.
We focus on one particular kind of NPE, among many that exist in reality, so we cannot claim that our results generally apply to all. For example, we abstract away from the issues of weak patents and nuisance litigation. Instead we model strong, but probabilistic patents, which can credibly be litigated. Our model is also one where, by design, the NPE has no outside source of patents. The only source of innovation in our economy are rms which carry out R&D and then have the option to produce a product. In this sense, all innovation in our model is endogenous and is determined directly by the rewards stemming from obtaining patents.
Our model allows us to study the eect of NPEs by comparing two cases: a benchmark economy where NPEs do not exist (or cannot litigate as a producing entity can), and an economy where NPEs exist, and may buy patents, license them, and sue infringers, just as a producing rm would. We nd that
NPEs change the the incentives of innovators in a very particular way. First, when rms emerge from the research stage with symmetric patent portfolios, NPEs can at best earn zero prots and do not aect the continuation payos of the producing rms in the subsequent patent trade and litigation subgames. On the other hand, when the outcome of the R&D process is that one rm makes more discoveries than the other, and therefore has a larger portfolio, we nd that the NPE indeed aects the equilibrium payos of the producing rms. We fully characterize this eect by looking at all the dierent possible cases, depending on the parameters of the model: the magnitude of legal costs (c), the structure of industry prots (π m and π d ), the uncertainty of litigation outcomes (β and I), and the rewards of successful plaintis (F and R).
In the latter case (with asymmetric patent portfolios), we nd that generally the eect of the NPE is to widen the gap between the equilibrium prot of the 'leader' rm and that of the 'losing' rm. Therefore ex ante rewards to innovation increase, since the marginal value of obtaining a patent increases. In this case the NPE may make positive prots, and this is entirely at the expense of the follower rm. That is, the NPE does not aect the continuation payo of the leader rm, which emerges from the research stage with a larger patent portfolio. But the NPE does lower the continuation payo of the follower, because it can credibly threaten to inict upon it larger legal costs, which in the absence of an NPE the leader rm could not do. Since these higher costs are credible, the NPE can extract more surplus from the follower rm in a licensing deal. Thus the rm which ex post turns out to be the follower is worse o when an NPE is active in the economy.
Our analysis also shows that while the NPE generally increases the incentives for innovation, in some circumstances it may do so in undesirable ways, by acting as an entry deterrent and eectively allowing the leader rm to monopolise the product market. Notice that this monopolisation may happen even in the absence of any NPEs, for some parameter values of the model. However, the NPE may allow one rm to monopolise the market for a strictly larger set of parameter values, and hence the overall eect of the NPE on welfare may be negative, because it expands the set of circumstances where one rm dominates the market.
Although our main model assumes that patent holders make take-it-or-leave-it licence oers to other rms, we also extend the results to the more general setting where each agent has some bargaining power in the licence and patent trade stages. Our results are robust in this sense, and remain qualitatively unchanged.
We also study the dierent incentives of an NPE and of a hypothetical third rm which may engage in the same sort of patent trade and licencing. We show that a patent owner might strictly prefer to sell a patent to the NPE, rather than to another rm, if in the latter case it would enable the third rm to enter the product market, which it otherwise would not have done. In that sense selling to an NPE may be preferred because it increases the leader's prots without inducing additional entry in the product market.
Having analyzed the possible outcomes of the patent trade and litigation games, we go one step backward and study the incentives for innovation in the intermediate research stage, where there is already one discovery. Since the NPE does not aect a leader rm's continuation payos, but does lower a follower rm's payos, it increases the margin between winning and losing the last research stage. Therefore the incentive of the rm with no discoveries to invest eort in R&D increases in the presence of an NPE. As an equilibrium consequence, the total amount of eort in this stage increases, which implies a higher rate of innovation in the intermediate stage. Finally, going back to the initial research stage, we show that again the presence of an NPE increases the margin between having one patent or none. In the initial stage both rms are symmetric and therefore both increase their eort. The intuition for this result is quite transparent: what matters for the rate of innovation is not just the overall surplus that rms receive from their patents, but rather, the dierence between being the rm which makes more discoveries and being the rm which makes fewer discoveries. We think this is an interesting, perhaps counter-intuitive, insight, which shows why a theoretical model of the role of NPEs is a valuable contribution to the literature.
Appendix A: Analysis of equilibrium payos
We now analyze the eect of the NPE on equilibrium payos.
Single owner
First, consider the case where rm 1 (wlog) discovers both components x and y. This is the case where trade in patents can potentially occur, as long as the NPE and rm 1 can increase their joint prots by extracting surplus from rm 2. Suppose the NPE can make a TIOLI oer for one or both of rm 1's patents. There are three continuation games to consider: Game 1, Game A and Game D.
In what follows, we restrict attention to the case where litigation is protable (i.e. it is a credible threat o the equilibrium path), entry in the nal product market is protable for the rms, and, all else being equal, all parties prefer to license as much as possible.
• Game 1. Under the assumptions:
The equilibrium of Game 1, where rm 1 owns both patents, has the following payos:
• Game A. Under the assumptions:
The equilibrium of Game A, where the NPE buys both patents from rm 1, has the following payos:
• Game D. Under the assumptions:
The equilibrium of Game D, where the NPE buys 1 patent from rm 1 and rm 1 keeps the other patent, has the following payos:
Under the assumption that the NPE makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer, given the price p k for the patent of The NPE will decide its oers considering these regions. If it oers too little, the patent owner will not sell the patents. In that case, the NPE gets zero payo. If the NPE sets p k ≥ γ and p −k < α, the rm will only sell the patent for component k. In this case, the highest payo the NPE can get is by buying the patent as cheap as possible: π * N P E,1 = β(F + R) + c − γ. If the NPE sets p k > γ and p 1 + p 2 ≥α, the it will end up buying both patents. Therefore, the highest payo the NPE can get is by buying the patent as cheap as possible: π * N P E,2 = β(2 − β)F + 2βR + c − 2α. Notice that the NPE loses money by buying both patents. Then, the only case where the NPE makes money is where it buys one of the patents, i.e.: The left hand side c + β 2 F represents the extra surplus the NPE can extract from rm 2. Because suing for both components bundles up the trial's cost, rm 2 saves in litigation costs an amount c. However, when rm 2 is sued by two parties, it has to pay the litigation cost twice. This is the rst component of what the NPE can do and what rm 1 cannot commit to do in equilibrium. The second component relates to the infringement fee per product. Since these fees are awarded once per rm, the NPE can gather the extra fee F when both components infringe. If both components infringe (which occurs with probability β 2 ) rm 1 receives only F for the double infringement, while selling to the NPE allows them to joinlt extract 2F from rm 2. The right hand side is what rm 1 loses by selling to the NPE. If the patent sold to the NPE is the only one that infringes (which occurs with probability β(1 − β)), rm 1 will have forgone the opportunity to extract Iπ d from rm 2.
Multiple owners
Consider the case where the two components were patented by dierent rms, e.g. rm 1 discovers x and rm 2 discovers y. Again, the NPE will make TIOLI oers for the patents, and there are three continuation games to consider: Game 2, Game B and Game C.
As above, we restrict attention to the case where litigation is protable (i.e. it is a credible threat o the equilibrium path), entry in the nal product market is protable for the rms, and, all else being equal, all parties prefer to license as much as possible.
• Game 2. Under the assumptions: The equilibrium of Game C, where the NPE buys 1 patent from rm 1 and rm 2 keeps the other patent, has the following payos:
Notice that independently of rm j selling or keeping its patent, rm i will sell its own i
However, buying patents at these prices is not protable for the NPE. At best, when I = 0, the NPE breaks even. Therefore, in equilibrium the NPE is never willing to buy patents and the nal equilibrium payos are
and hence the NPE has no impact on the equilibrium payos when the two rms each make one discovery.
Remark: All of the assumptions that we have used above simplify to the following set of conditions Proof. That (0, 0) is an equilibrium we can see immediately from the objective function. Suppose we have an equilibrium where (u 1 , u 2 ) > 0. Then, dividing the two FOC we have
Replacing u 1 = u 2 = u * in the equilibrium condition (FOC 1) we get
Lemma
When θ > 0 (with NPEs), there are two equilibria: (u 1 , u 2 ) = (0, 0) and (u 1 , u 2 ) > 0, where u 2 = Ku 1 and K > 1.
Proof. That (0, 0) is an equilibrium we can see immediately from the objective function.
In an equilibrium where (u 1 , u 2 ) > 0 by dividing the two FOC we have
Then, replacing u 2 = Ku 1 in the equilibrium condition (FOC 1) we get
The dierence D(θ) = V * (θ) − V * * (θ) is positive for all θ and D(θ) > D(0), for all θ. In any equilibrium we must have u * 1 = u * 2 . Suppose by contradiction that u * 1 > u * 2 . By convexity of c(·) But as long as V * − V * * > 0 this implies u * 2 > u * 1 , which is a contradiction.
• (A,A,A):
• (A,R,A):
• (R,A,A):
• (A,R,R):
• (R,A,R):
• (R,R,A): 
